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Introduction  
 
The concept of ‘mode of coordination’ captures the way economy is embedded in 
social relationships and influences the integration of society through an ‘instituted 
process.’ Accordingly, the role of economy as the ‘cement’ of society (Elster, 1989) 
can be understood through an analysis of different modes of coordination which 
define the special and unique institutional arrangement through which economy 
may coordinate human activities in different historical situations. Another related 
assumption on which this concept has been founded is the inseparability of 
sovereignty and property. “Sovereignty is inseparable from property. It is the 
sanctions of sovereignty that make property what it is for the time being in any 
country, because physical force, or violence, is the last and final appeal when the 
other sanctions are deemed inadequate to control individuals. Economic science, in 
England and America, began with the separation of property from sovereignty, on 
the assumption that private property was a natural, primordial right of individuals, 
independent of sovereignty which might artificially and unjustly interfere with it. 
But this was a substitution of justification for fact, as is often the method of 
argument in economics and politics.” (Commons, 1970, p. 41).  
 
The separation of property rights and sovereignty muddles the concept of property 
rights. The reason is that among different types of property rights, the one which 
cannot be contracted away is abusus, while both usus and fructus can be contracted 
without causing any damage to the very right of ownership. Thus the ultimate 
boundary of ownership is the right to destroy.   
 
The concept of ‘mode of coordination’ helps us to grasp how economic activity is 
coordinated under the dominance of each form of power. Many authors have used 
similar or even synonymous concepts to cast light on the integrating role of 
economy in human society. Among these authors we should especially note Polanyi 
([1957] 1968, pp. 148-49) who employs ‘forms or patterns of integration’, and 
Lindblom (1977) who uses ‘control mechanisms’ and finally, Kornai (1984, 1992) 
who also suggests ‘modes of coordination’. All these authors conceive of economy 
as an ‘instituted process’ and underline the inseparability of politics and economics 
in “the analysis of basic social mechanisms and systems” (Lindblom, 1977, p. 8). 
Three main typical or ideal modes of coordination have been identified in the 
literature1: 
                                                 
1
 This classification is not exhaustive. Other types of coordination are also mentioned in the 
literature. For instance, Polanyi (1944) refers to ‘householding’ as a separate form of integration 
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1) Market mode of coordination is social organisation through exchange and 
markets. Polanyi (1944, [1957] 1968) and Lindblom (1977) coin this form of 
integration as ‘exchange’ which requires a specific institution, namely a system of 
price-making markets. 
2) Ethical mode of coordination is social organisation through ‘reciprocity’ 
(Polanyi, 1944, [1957] 1968). It assumes for a background another specific 
institution, namely symmetrically arranged groupings such as a kinship system. 
Individuals as part of a tribe, a clan, a family or a religious community identify 
themselves with the group and the adherence to rules constitutes the code of 
honour. Lindblom (1977) calls it a ‘preceptoral system’, from the word ‘preceptor’, 
meaning teacher. Integration through control of communication means, 
indoctrination and persuasion is the core of the system. 
3) Bureaucratic mode of coordination is social organisation through the 
authority of government. Polanyi (1944, [1957] 1968) names it ‘redistribution’ that 
designates appropriational movements toward a centre and out of it. It is dependent 
upon the presence of some measures of centricity in the group like the state.  
 
A typical or ideal model is of course an abstraction that selects a group of closely 
related elements from real world mixed systems. There is no real social system that 
can be exclusively coordinated by only one of these modes of coordination. The 
study of these known modes of coordination is not the focus of this paper2. Our 
purpose is to introduce another type of coordination that we name ‘destructive 
mode of coordination’. It is social organisation through the use of coercive means. 
This type of coordination has almost been entirely neglected in the literature, 
although it has existed since ancient times in different forms and varieties. A typical 
recent illustration is the social order under the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran is not 
the sole example in the Middle East; many others can be cited in that region as well 
as in Africa and Latin America. Destructive coordination also describes sectoral 
logic of the Military Industrial Complex in developed market economies like the 
United States, and in Post Socialist economies such as Russia and China. 
Historically, colonialism, the ‘primitive accumulation of capital’, and the Stalinist 
regime from 1933 to1938 may be invoked as examples from the recent past. 
Looting tribes and pirate colonies in the past and present provide other illustrations. 
Although I will refer to all these evidences, my main focus will be Iran since the 
1979 revolution. In introducing this particular type of coordination, it is however 
necessary first to scrutinize our notion of ‘mode of coordination’. 
 
While economy is an instituted process, the particular institutional arrangements are 
in turn determined by power relationships. In this perspective, the market mode of 
                                                                                                                                        
mechanism. Kornai (1992) also notes two other coordinating mechanisms, namely ‘family 
coordination’ (which is a synonym expression of Polanyi’s ‘householding’) and ‘self-governing 
coordination’. However, the difference between the latter and an ethical mode of coordination is not 
clear in Kornai’s work.  
2
 For an excellent description of these three modes of coordination from the viewpoint of decision, 
information and motivation structures, see Kornai (1984, 1992). 
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coordination is related to economic power (control over means of production and 
transactions) and its full development depends on the separation of economic power 
from other forms of power during modernity. The ethical mode of coordination is 
associated with moral power (control over beliefs, ideas, and means of 
communication), and the bureaucratic mode of coordination is linked to 
governmental authority or to institutionalized destructive power (control over 
coercive means). Since, the state has monopoly over violence in modern times, the 
predominance of non institutionalized violence marks anarchy or disorder (the 
Hobbesian state). It seems then that social organisation through the direct use of 
coercive means is an oxymoron.  
 
However, even in modern times, such kind of social organisation exists and, under 
certain conditions constitutes a more or less stable system. In fact, I will argue that 
in modern times ‘destructive mode of coordination’ can be characterized as a 
specific system of contradictory orders and parallel institutions that requires the 
permanent use of direct coercive means to guarantee the unstable dominance of one 
over the other. This type of coordination is located between social order and 
disorder. Accordingly, the first part of this paper will introduce the concept of 
contradictory orders in general, and then focus on the specific types of contradictory 
orders on which destructive coordination is founded in modern times. Other major 
characteristics of destructive coordination will be discussed in the second part.  
 
1. Main sources of contradictory orders 
 
The new institutional economics has produced a vast literature on order and 
disorder. Its main result can be summarized in the following way: there are three 
ideal states of political organization, namely the consensual authoritarian bases of 
political order, and political disorder (North, Summerhill, Weingast, 2000, p. 29). 
“In brief, we argue that political order can emerge in one of two ways: an 
authoritarian society where order is based on coercion and a consensual society 
where order is based on social cooperation.” (op.cit., pp. 50-51). In both cases, legal 
coercion is the monopoly of the state. The institutionalized violence is the 
foundation of sovereignty that guarantees the external enforcement and hence the 
stability of a social order. The absence of such a monopoly results in a rupture in 
the external enforcement and implies disorder and chaos. For example, a 
revolutionary period is a period of disorder or anarchy where sovereignty crisis or 
institutional vacuum reigns. It is a period of ‘no man’s land’ that sometimes leads to 
a ‘dual power’ (for instance, in the Russian February revolution in 1917, or during 
the Spanish Civil War as well as the Iranian February revolution in 1979). This 
period is characterized by the fact that while the old institutional arrangements are 
no longer dominant, the new ones are not yet mature enough to regulate social 
order. Rules are challenged and not enforced, state has no monopoly over violence 
and anarchy prevails. The literature acknowledges then these three states: 
authoritarian and consensus political orders where there is a unique social order, 
and a regime of political disorder that lacks such kind of unified order. What the 
literature misses is an analysis of contradictory orders in which order and disorder 
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cannot be so neatly distinguished. Such kind of contradictory orders are a clue to 
the understanding of the coexistence of institutionalized and non institutionalized 
coercion.  
 
Bureaucratic mode of coordination is a hierarchical system based on command in 
which subordinates know that the command is underpinned by a legal compulsion 
and legal sanctions. This type of coordination is based upon institutionalized 
destructive power. Disorder can be defined by a non institutionalized destructive 
power. Between the two, there exists a destructive coordination. The first 
characteristic of this type of coordination is that it is based on a more or less stable 
coexistence of contradictory rules or parallel institutions that can only mitigate or 
‘resolve’ their differences according to their relative balance of power. While the 
dependence on balance of power gives an anarchic (or non-institutionalized) 
character to this type of coordination, its reliance on the coexistence of 
contradictory orders assures its institutionalized character. A somehow uncouth 
expression of institutionalized non institutionalized destructive power may capture 
this duality. Such kind of coordination feeds on crisis and perpetuates itself as long 
as the crisis lasts. Its tendency is to enhance ‘organized chaos’ through a ‘chaotic 
organization’ or parallel institutions. Studying contradictory orders is the first step 
to understand destructive coordination. 
 
1.1 Contradictory orders and extra state law 
 
The fact that an individual or a community may consider a plurality of contradictory 
systems of order as simultaneously valid has been known to sociologists for a long 
time. Weber provides several examples. “A person who fights a duel follows the 
code of honour; but at the same time, insofar as he either keeps it secret or 
conversely gives himself up to the police, he takes account of the criminal law.” 
(1968, vol. 1, p. 32). In this case, an internal mechanism of enforcement, namely the 
‘code of honour’ based on tradition and custom contradicts the state law or the 
external mechanism. The coexistence of the two orders may be a stable or an 
unstable one depending on whether the evasion or contravention of the generally 
understood meaning of an order has become the rule or not. If there are status 
groups stronger than the state which rely on the ‘honour code’ of the duel as means 
of resolving conflicts, then we may have a particular situation as in the German 
army till very recently. In Germany, the readiness to participate in a duel was still a 
legal obligation imposed by the state upon its army officers even though the duel 
was expressly forbidden by the criminal code. The ‘compromise’ between the state 
and tradition was that while in the army the code of honour was officially 
acknowledged, outside the status group of army officers, the situation was different 
and duel was subject to criminal code.  
 
Weber also cites the example of Slavic Zadruga in imperial Austria where some of 
its norms were outright contradictory to the official law but enforced and supported 
by Zadruga’s own coercive apparatus and “only the state, if invoked, would refuse 
recognition and proceed, through its coercive power, to break it up.” (Weber, 1968, 
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vol. 1, p. 316). Another interesting example goes back to the Middle Ages where 
the prohibitions of resorting to the ecclesiastical court included in the statutes of 
certain merchants’ guilds were clearly invalid from the point of view of canon law, 
but they nonetheless persisted.  
 
To understand different sources of contradictory orders, one should remember that 
the monopoly of violence by the state is a new phenomenon, but even today the 
state has no monopoly over all the coercive means especially the moral means of 
coercion. We speak of ‘state’ law, i.e. of law guaranteed by the state, only when 
legal coercion is exercised through physical means of coercion of the political 
community. Wherever the means of coercion which provide the guarantee for a 
‘right’ belong to some other authority such as a hierocracy, then one can speak of 
‘extra-state law’. Moreover, the importance of coercive means in external 
enforcement notwithstanding, non violent means of destructive power such as 
exclusion from an organization or a community, a boycott, or the promise of reward 
and punishment in the next world may be under certain conditions much more 
efficient in producing compliance than a political apparatus whose coercive 
functioning is not always predictable. In such circumstances, individuals and social 
groups may follow other orders than what is officially promulgated by the state law. 
 
The most acute forms of ‘extra-state law’ are those related to a sovereignty crisis or 
a dual power situation that has usually been observed during revolution, war, and 
military occupation where the clash of contradictory orders may be so intense that 
disorder and anarchy ensue. But there are other more or less stable forms of 
coexistence between different types of authority that can lead to an intermediate 
state between social order and disorder with parallel institutions. The mode of 
coordination in such intermediate state is destructive, since extra legal or direct 
coercion paradoxically plays a key role in controlling and integrating parallel 
institutions. It should be particularly emphasised that only contradictory orders that 
weaken or undermine the state monopoly over physical means of coercion come 
within the scope of destructive coordination, since in such cases conflict resolution 
between parallel institutions relies upon extra legal coercive means or the balance 
of power. Other types of contradictory orders may not necessarily require the 
intervention of non-institutionalised coercion and can be explicated as specific 
constellations of the three known coordinating mechanisms, namely market, 
bureaucratic and ethical (reciprocity).  
 
The emergence of different varieties of destructive mode of coordination is related 
to the particular way that such specific system of contradictory orders has come into 
existence. The rest of this section will highlight solely those contradictory orders 
that lead to destructive coordination. 
 
1.2 State authority and religious authority 
 
As earlier noted, the monopoly of the state over the physical means of coercion 
does not exclude religious authority over moral coercion. However, under Islamic 
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laws, the religious authority equally claims a dominant role over the use of physical 
violence in two ways. The first way of legitimating the use of immediate coercion 
concerns Jihad or the holy war, and the second one is known as hisba. In the 
Islamic legal literature (fiqh), the term hisba indicates the duty of every Muslim to 
command right and forbid wrong. These two ways are closely related both 
theoretically and practically. 
 
From the earliest days of the Islamic polity, especially from the time of 
Muhammad’s hegira3, one of the most important duties of its leaders, be he the 
Prophet or a caliph, was to organise and lead the Jihad fi sabil allah, i.e. the holy 
war in the path of God against the unbelievers. Koranic injunctions are 
unambiguous on the subject and encourage the faithful for the Jihad (see Cook, 
2005, chapter 1). 
 
The Jihad was at the outset part of the holy obligations of Islamic state to conquer 
other non believer states and expand Islam. However, the Byzantine’s offensive in 
the 740s changed the situation. It was the end of what has been termed “the Jihad 
state”, but “the Jihad itself did not; it simply became what we today would call 
‘privatised’, that is, it went from centrally directed state campaigns to independent, 
non-governmentally controlled, smaller scale raids led and manned by 
mutatawwi’a, volunteer warriors for the faith. This transferral of religious 
leadership in the Jihad, from the Caliph to the mutatawwi’a, in turn led to truly 
fundamental changes in all areas of Islamic civilisation.” (Tor, 2005, p. 558).  
 
The mutatawwi’a movement posed a fundamental question regarding the proper 
role of the political authorities in the Jihad: should political leaders have control 
over the Jihad, or is it a religious obligation, like any other ones such as giving of 
alms, for any believer who may commit himself to it? The victory of the second 
view marked the transition from caliphal religious stature and authority to Prophetic 
Sunna or guidance by the Prophetic tradition which was eventually adopted by both 
the Shafi’ite and Hanbalite schools of Sunnism in the late Umayyad period (Crone 
and Hinds, 1990, pp. 84-85). The ‘privatized’ Jihad is what being carried out today 
by the groups like Al Qaida in all Sunni Moslems World undermining the authority 
of political leaderships in Arab countries especially in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Contrary to Sunni Traditionists, Ithna Ashari Shiism as a Persian version of Islam 
was from the outset an oppositional tendency against caliphal religious authority 
(Savory, 1990, p. 15). The Jihad has always been considered by Shiites as the 
individual responsibility of the believer before God. The 1979 Iranian Revolution 
was interpreted by Islamic Fundamentalism as Jihad (Özbudam, 1990, p. 244), and 
the war against Iraq was also coined as Jihad (Zabih, 1988, pp. 149-152).  
 
After the 1979 revolution, the Shiite theocratic power in Iran had no confidence in 
the standing army and bureaucracy of the Shah’s period, and hence created its own 
                                                 
3
 Weber (1968, vol. 2, pp. 623-27) claims that during the Medina period, Islam transformed from its 
pristine form into a “national Arabic warrior religion”. 
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parallel military forces and administration. The creation of Sepah Pasdaran (Guard 
Corps of the Islamic Revolution), and Basijis (the Volunteers Corps of the 
Organisation for the Mobilization) was part of the Islamisation project of the armed 
forces. The two central concepts on which these new ‘revolutionary Islamic’ 
institutions have been built were the Jihad and Shahadat (Martyrdom)4. Dozens of 
official or semi-official military groups attached to Sepah and other religious 
foundations that are trained in Iran for waging war against non believers and 
infidels all over the world and the export of Ithna Ashari Shiism are indoctrinated 
by the Jihad concept. Contrary to Sunnism, the ‘state Jihad’ is the dominant form in 
Iran. It doesn’t mean that the state in Iran has control over all the semi-official or 
para military groups, since Shiite religious hierarchy is not mono-centrist but multi-
centrist with different Mojtaheds (religious scholars) each having the authority to 
formulate his proper verdict about different issues including the Jihad. In other 
Shiite movements in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, etc. there are a mixture of semi state and 
semi private Jihad5. The Iranian Republic Islamic endeavours to achieve the 
religious and political leadership in the Moslem World through an anti-American 
and anti-Israeli campaign and the state Jihad. This strategy has already provoked 
great tensions with many Sunni Arab leaders especially with those of the Saudi 
Arabia who have no religious authority over the Jihad (for other sources of tensions 
see, Fürtig, 2002).   
 
If the Jihad focuses on imposing the divinely-ordained order upon the Dar al-Harb 
(belligerent countries), the hisba seeks to impose this same order within the Dar al-
Islam (the Islamic community). Although all Muslim scholars and Islamic schools 
of law agree to regard hisba (to command right and forbid wrong), there is no 
consensus about the way it should be put in effect. The ambiguity of the concept 
(Cook, 2003) has lent credence to the controversy about: “Which kind of duty must 
the hisba be related to? Who may and who must fulfil these duties respectively? 
With what means may this duty be fulfilled and is it allowed to use violence?” 
(Abdelsalam, 2005, p.  548). The majority of scholars regard hisba as a collective 
duty incumbent upon the Muslim community as a whole. Regarding the question of 
who is allowed to fulfil the duty of hisba, Ghazali (1058-1111), the great scholar of 
the Shafi’i school, holds that every Muslim is allowed to exercise hisba. The 
scholars disagree in their answers to the questions of when, how, and by whom 
hisba should be practiced in a violent way. “Whereas Mawardi permits the legal 
usage of violence only by the muhtasib appointed on behalf of the ruler, Ghazali 
Juwaini (d. 1085, shafi’i) and Shaykhzada al-Hanafi (d. 1887, hanafi) allow the use 
of violence by any Muslim to prevent munker [the one who denies the faith]. At the 
same time, Ghazali and Juwaini recommend the prior approval of the sultan -albeit 
legally not necessary- to prevent disturbances.” (Abdelsalam, 2005, p. 551; the 
phrase in the bracket is added). 
 
                                                 
4
 For the Islamisation of the Armed Forces in Iran after the 1979 revolution, see Eisenstadt, 1996; 
Entessar, 1988; Katzman, 1993; Schahgadian, 1987; Zabih, 1988.  
5
 Regarding Hezbollah, see Kramer, 1990, pp. 105-130. 
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In Islamic Republic of Iran, hisba is practised systematically both at the state and 
the private level. The state has created several special repressive units against non 
compliance to hijab (the Islamic way of covering women’s body). But unofficial 
and semi-official extremist squads such as the Vengeance of God patrol also 
intervene to punish insufficiently veiled women or feminist protesters. It should not 
be forgotten that an Iranian non state foundation (panzdah khordad) unilaterally 
took the initiative in 1989 to offer the 2 million dollars “bounty” for Mr Salman 
Rushdie, the British author of the Satanic Verses (1988) (Financial Times, July 17, 
1997).  
 
In both the Jihad and the hisba, non institutionalized or ‘private’ and semi-state 
violence may be legitimized and institutionalized by some doctrinal and religious 
references. The monopoly of state over physical coercion will accordingly be 
undermined and as a result of this specific type of contradictory orders destructive 
coordination pervades. 
 
1.3 Formal central authority and informal local authority 
 
Contradictory orders also emerge when the formal central rules coexist with 
opposite informal rules at a local level. The examples are abundant. Weber’s 
reference to Slavic Zadruga in Imperial Austria is one of these illustrations that may 
be completed by many other examples where local ethnic or non ethnic customs and 
traditions are commonly practiced despite explicit opposite prescriptions by the 
official law. Different regional traditions as well as different religious rituals in 
India provide ample evidences in this respect. The disintegration of a central 
government into regional warlords due to power vacuum or separatist ethnic 
movements such as China in the 1920s and 1930s, and ex-Yugoslavia during the 
1990s are extreme cases where contradictory orders lead to chaos and anarchy. But 
contradictory orders are not always so extreme. 
 
For example, the coexistence of contradictory local and central rules is the key to 
grasp the Mafia. According to Hobsbawm, a mafia “recognized no obligation 
except those of the code of honour or omertà (manliness), whose chief article 
forbade giving information to the public authorities. In other words mafia …was the 
sort of code of behavior which always tends to develop in societies without public 
order, or in societies in which citizens regard the authorities as wholly or partly 
hostile (for instance in jails or in the underworld outside them), or as unappreciative 
of the things which really matter (for instance in schools), or as a combination of 
both.” (1963, p. 32).  
 
The historical development of the Mafia under a central state also testifies that the 
existence of this organization is related to what is called “parallel system”. 
Undoubtedly, the Mafia’s period of greatest glory comes after 1890. Sicilian 
peasants have throughout history lived under the double régime of a remote and 
generally foreign central government and a local régime of slave or feudal lords; 
since theirs was par excellence the country of the latifundium. They were never, and 
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could never be, in the habit of regarding the central government as a real state, but 
merely as a special type of brigand, whose soldiers, tax-collectors, policemen and 
courts fell upon them from time to time. Their lives were lived “between the lord 
with his strong-arm men and parasites and their own defensive customs and 
traditions. In a sense, therefore, something like the ‘parallel system’ must always 
have existed, as it exists in all backward peasant societies.” (Hobsbawm, 1963, p. 
36). Although, this ‘parallel system’ was not yet the Mafia, it was the foundation on 
which this organization grew. In other words, even in case of organized crimes, the 
question is not one of the absence of rules or code of honor but a private code of 
honor and rival rules of conduct. The Mafia is another salient example of 
destructive coordination. 
 
1.4 Borderline situations  
 
Contradictory orders are not only the outcome of divisions between the state and the 
religious authorities or central and local ones, they can directly stem from the 
internal contradictions of an autonomous state apparatus and its ruling elite in a 
critical situation vis-à-vis the society. By ‘borderline situations’, I mean intense 
critical social and political situations where order is on the verge of transforming 
into disorder. It can be depicted as a civil war within the state apparatus and its 
officeholders due to the internal contradictions of the apparatus itself and its 
structural and functional inability to deal with social and economic problems. 
Borderline situations may transpire both in authoritarian and democratic regimes.   
 
An authoritarian regime is more prone to turn into a struggle of each against all 
within officialdom in borderline situations. One classical example is the Soviet 
Union during the period of 1933-1938 which Kornai (1984) refers to as an 
illustration of ‘aggressive mode of coordination’6. There is a vast literature that 
attributes the planning and execution of police repression during the ‘Great purge’ 
to Stalin’s vengeful tyranny. However, the recent studies of Rittersporn show that 
“the terror emerges as a typical product of the system’s internal conflicts, one of its 
instruments, so that even if it served as an ultima ratio, its use was chaotic, 
uncontrollable and manipulated by almost every dignitary.” (1991, p. 114).  
 
The period under consideration was the transition of an authoritarian regime to a 
chaotic order within the state apparatus, while the civil society could use only one 
powerful weapon to confront the rulers: sabotage, absenteeism, or passive 
resistance. The political disorder in the summit of power could not yet burst into 
                                                 
6
 An expression that Kornai uses only once (Kornai, 1984), and does not repeat in his later 
classification of different modes of coordination (Kornai, 1992). He dwells very briefly upon 
‘aggressive mode of coordination’ and defines it in this manner: “This is a wilful force not 
acknowledged by law and morality. This is precisely what distinguished it from No. 1 [a 
bureaucratic mode of coordination]: coercion is not institutionalised. For this reason it is mostly not 
lasting but of occasional nature.” (Kornai, 1984, p. 308; the phrase in the bracket is added). Perhaps 
Kornai’s insistence on ‘occasional nature’ of this type of coordination is the reason for his later 
omission of it. Despite Kornai’s insightful remark, he fails to note the relationship between 
contradictory orders or parallel institutions with more stable forms of ‘aggressive coordination’. 
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major political upheavals in the society. The final outcome was the creation of a 
‘state within the state’ that I call a borderline situation between order and disorder 
where destructive coordination was dominant. This borderline situation was neither 
an authoritarian regime, nor a consensus regime, and yet it was different from social 
disorder. 
 
Borderline situations also occur in consensual regimes. Borrowing from the author 
of Della ragione di Stato (1589), this type of situation can be called ‘reason of 
state’ (raison d’Etat)7. In later editions of his book, Botero (1599) distinguishes two 
types of ‘reason of state’, namely ordinary and extraordinary ones. The first 
designates all the governmental imperatives that are generally compatible with the 
common morality and Christian divine laws, whereas the second alludes to those 
imperatives which do not obey morality.  The first type of ‘reason of state’ concerns 
the knowledge about the ordinary means of governing in order to establish or to 
expand the domination. The extra-ordinary ‘reason of state’ alludes to all the 
necessary means for preserving the domination (Bonnet, 2003, p. 321). The recent 
usage of the expression is limited to the latter one where the use of all coercive 
means are exceptionally authorized for the sake of ‘the national interest’ and for 
maintaining ‘public order’ regardless of its compatibility with divine or human 
laws. The focus on interest and expediency divorced from morality is justified on 
the grounds that a ‘bad’ action should be taken to avoid a ‘worse’ or a more 
disastrous one (Descendre, 2003). Presently, it is cited to support the action of a 
state or that of state officials which should remain secret to avoid a war, a 
revolution, a pandemic, or an abdication.  
  
Accordingly, ‘reason of state’ allows a ‘state within the state’ situation with parallel 
institutions where direct coercion occupies a central place in controlling and 
integrating activities. A destructive mode of coordination is thus in order either for 
temporary periods or for more stable periods in specific sectors such as defence and 
military ones. During the Algerian war, France pleaded for ‘raison d’Etat’ and came 
to this borderline situation. Watergate, Iran Gate and many other secret activities of 
the Pentagon and the CIA such as launching coup d’Etat against ‘non friendly’ 
governments such as Iranian’s Prime Minister Mossadeq in 1953 have been initially 
justified on the basis of ‘reason of state’8. Of course, the examples can be easily 
                                                 
7
 Niccolo Machiavelli is usually cited as the pioneer of this concept. The author of The Prince 
(1519) has pointed out that the state’s highest good was to maintain itself; it often had to take an 
expedient course of action which was in fact contrary to religion and morality. 
8
 Heilbroner ([1962] 1972, p. 256) has noted this ‘aggressive’ tendency in American capitalism after 
the second World War: “There is no doubt that in recent years American capitalism has become a 
military state that feels itself impelled to police the world. Since World War II, the United States has 
intervened in Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; has 
clandestinely overthrown at least one government (Guatemala), and probably another (Iran).” 
Heilbroner’s clever guess is today a certainty, since during Clinton’s presidency, Mrs Madeleine 
Korbel Albright who served as the Secretary of State officially acknowledged the CIA’s 
involvement in the putsch against Mossadeq’s cabinet in 1953.  
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multiplied in dozens9. The activities of the Military Industrial Complex (MIC) in 
developing different forms of destructive technology and in trading armaments 
require extreme confidentiality, and are usually covered legally by ‘reason of state’ 
or ‘the national interest’. It is not shocking that the profits of this sector depend on 
warfare, and hence ‘chaos’ is their source of revenue. Destructive coordination 
depicts the rationale of the MIC. However, in consensual or democratic regimes, 
such borderline situations are more exceptional and sectoral than common and 
durable. Parliamentary or Senate commissions can check the extra legal activities 
within the state apparatus, and independent journals can sometimes play a 
countervailing force. 
 
1.5 Emerging state and factional politics 
 
In a democratic regime, different political formations can resolve their conflicts and 
find a compromise or at least an arrangement on the basis of established 
constitutional law and institutions. However, in the absence of such institutions, the 
formation of a coalition government or the resolution of political disputes requires 
an arbiter who can fill the institutional gap by exercising an influential role on all 
the parties. A charismatic leader, a powerful external force, or traditional 
arrangements may assume the arbitrage. But in any case, arbiter is by himself an 
institution over and above the nascent institutions. In case of charismatic leadership, 
such as what Iran witnessed under Khomeyni, the arbiter represents once and at the 
same time all social groups despite their opposite and sometimes antagonistic 
interests. If necessary the arbiter may be more ‘leftist’ than any leftist group in 
defending workers demands, and more ‘rightist’ than any farouche partisan of the 
sanctity of private property. In short, the arbiter ‘represents’ all social groups and at 
the same time suppresses all of them by depriving them from their direct organised 
political representations. Accordingly, every major change in the political balance 
between different social groups provokes a ‘representation’ crisis, and the use of 
extra legal or coercive means would be in order. In the absence of organised 
political representations, demagogy and populist mobilisations combined with a 
dozen petit coups are the ‘normal’ way of governing and resolving factional 
rivalries.  
 
The Islamic Republic of Iran since 1979 and Lebanon’s coalition government 
during the 1980s are two recent examples of contradictory orders due to intense 
factional rivalries. In both cases, a destructive mode of coordination is in place. The 
constitution of an official or unofficial ‘coalition’ government in Lebanon and in 
Iran does not imply a ‘consensual’ regime. Moreover, none of them can be simply 
considered as ‘authoritarian’ despite all the atrocities and continuous severe human 
violations under the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the major difference 
between them resides in the fact that the coalition government in Lebanon was the 
outcome of an international arrangement between different religious communities, 
whereas in Iran, Bazaar-Mosque alliance constituted the basis of a new state 
                                                 
9
 For an analysis of the new reason of state as a problem for democracy in world society, see Wolf 
(1999). 
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apparatus under the charismatic figure of Khomeyni as arbiter. The emerging state 
in Lebanon is now marred by a new international arrangement where disorder and 
chaos pervade. We will briefly discuss the Lebanese case and then dwell upon the 
Iranian situation in more detail, since it provides the most typical illustration of 
parallel institutions and destructive coordination.   
 
In Lebanon, the establishment of a coalition government composed of Christian 
Maronites, Sunni Druzites, and Shiites Hezbollah during the 1980s came after a 
long period of civil war in the seventies, and in the aftermath of the PLO’s 
withdrawal from South Lebanon due to Israeli’s invasion in 1982. The creation of a 
coalition state was brought under the auspices of International community. 
Although the state should have officially maintained the monopoly of all coercive 
means, each constituency of the coalition continued to have its ‘private’ militia and 
para military forces. A system of contradictory orders with extra-legal law was the 
rule. But this system was yet unstable and internally weak. Various political 
factions were supported by different external forces whose compromise at an 
international level could construct a central state. During the nineties, the 
strengthening of Hezbollah’s faction that represents the poor working Shiite 
population in the south of Lebanon and has the support of Syria and Iran rapidly 
changed the balance of power. The crumbling of this international arrangement 
since July 12th 2006 by Israeli’s devastating military assault on Lebanon with the 
United States’ support is now shattering the very foundation of this nascent state 
and reintroduces disorder and chaos.   
 
Since its foundation, the Islamic Republic of Iran has always been an unofficial 
coalition state under a charismatic leadership and marked by factional politics 
(Mohammad Ali Najafi, 2004, p. 412). In the absence of labour unions, political 
parties, professional societies, and neighbourhood associations during the Shah’s 
period, the bazaar-mosque alliance proved to be the central core of the 
revolutionary movement in 1979. The bazaar and the mosque, as inseparable twins, 
have served for many centuries and all through the Pahlavi’s dynasty, as the 
primary arena of public life in urban Iran (Ashraf, 1988; Ashraf and Banuazizi, 
1992). This central core entered into alliance with the militant intelligentsia and 
successively mobilised the marginal urban population and other social groups. It is 
usually argued that the Shah’s rapid modernization was the cause of the revolution. 
But in terms of material interests, the ulama (the Shiite clerics) had much more to 
lose than the bazaaris (traditional merchants) from the results of modernization. As 
Ashraf (1988, p. 562-63) rightly notes the ulama “were demoted from being a 
partner in the network of political domination to a position of relative 
powerlessness, while the bazaaris gained considerably in terms of material fortune. 
The majority of the ulama supported the 1977-79 revolution as a protest against 
their lost privileges. The big merchants and prosperous bazaaris supported the 
revolution on the assumption…that their lifestyle would be respected by the Islamic 
state, that they would be free from arbitrary domination of the state, and that in the 
new regime they would have many felicitous contacts within the state 
bureaucracy…Yet, on the whole, the revolution was primarily aimed by its 
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leadership at seizing the apparatus of the expanding modern state in order to export 
the revolution and establish an Islamic empire.”  
 
A theocratic regime was in opposition to the socio-economic requirements of a 
developing modern society and Western cultural values. In a sense it was the exact 
opposite of the Iranian incomplete constitutional revolution in 1906, since it 
introduced the new theocratic institution of the divine commission of the vicegerent 
of the jurisconsult (Welayat-i faqih) to assume political authority and sovereignty as 
the vicegerent of the Hidden Imam. But at the same time, Khomeyni was the heir of 
a revolutionary uprising against the Shah’s autocracy. The Islamic Republic was an 
oxymoron, since it should combine together a ‘republic’ (the continuity of the 
constitutional revolution) and ‘Islamic’ government (a rupture and direct opposition 
with the constitutional tradition). The outcome of this contradiction was the new 
constitution adopted in 1980 that was advocating simultaneously parallel ‘elective’ 
(republican) and ‘nominative’ (theocratic) institutions.  
 
Khomeyni’s position incarnated this paradox: he had the control of a modernising 
state apparatus, while as a supreme theocratic ruler he transcended the 
constitutional constraints of an apparently legal-rational order, and assumed the title 
of the Imam, the position reserved in the Iranian Shii community exclusively for the 
twelve infallible Imams (see Ashraf, 1994; Ruhani, 1984). The Islamic Republic of 
Iran as a traditional theocratic state could only continue to live against the 
requirements of a modern society thanks to its monopoly over political power. 
Hence, it was not only born in a revolutionary crisis, but its continuity required a 
constant crisis on which it could nourish. One of the fundamental sources of parallel 
institutions or contradictory orders in Iran is this incompatibility between a 
theocratic regime and a modernising society. This incompatibility provides the basis 
of a destructive coordination where even identity of decision makers cannot be 
easily known due to the pervasiveness of the parallel institutions. Smith (1997) puts 
it in a nice way: “Ask an Iranian official, even a junior minister, what is going on 
and he is quite likely to answer that ‘they’ are doing this or that, rather than ‘we’. 
The Islamic Republic has come to depend on a system of parallel powers that keeps 
everybody, government servants included, partly in the dark. Most obscure is the 
identity of those who take the decisions that count. Almost every organisation has 
its shadow, and the shadow is often the weightier of the two.” The army has Sepah, 
the police and Komitehs are now formally unified, though practice may be lagging 
behind. In provinces, the provincial governors, appointed by the Ministry of the 
Interior, are shadowed by the imam jomeh (Friday prayer leaders) nominated by 
Wali Faqih (the supreme theocrat leader). The 270-member Majlis (Parliament) is 
officially shadowed by the 12-member Council of Guardians, whose six clerical 
members are appointed by the Leader. In case of conflict between the Majlis and 
the Guardians, another body named Expediency Council arbitrates between them. 
This institution has become a lawmaker of its own. 
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Parallel institutions reflect political factionalism10 in the absence of organised 
political representations of different social groups due to the charismatic role of the 
Supreme Leader as the ‘final arbiter’. When a consensual regime is not at work, 
intense political factionalism leads to destructive coordination. 
 
1.6 Colonialism and Military occupation 
 
In analysing colonialism and military occupation as a major source of contradictory 
orders, it is useful to distinguish between “empires of domination” and “territorial 
empires” (Mann, 1986). The former relies solely on the empire’s military striking 
power, whereas the latter hinges upon all the forms of power including the moral, 
economic and political ones. Compared to the British Empire, the recent American 
empire is an ‘incoherent’ one, since it lacks the necessary power to institutionalise 
its domination (Mann, 2005).  
 
For example, the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States was 
much easier than the instauration of a stable regime in both countries. In fact, for 
many years, conservative politicians in the U.S. have looked at peace keeping as a 
diversion from the main task at hand: fighting and winning the nation’s wars. But 
that was before the Bush administration made the pre-emptive use of military force 
and “regime change” the heart of its foreign policy. As Michael Gordon (2003, p. 4) 
rightly remarks, “Officials who dismissed the value of peace keeping are now 
committing American forces here to ‘peace enforcement’ operations to stabilize the 
country and lay the foundation for a new Iraqi government.”  
 
The presence of a ‘low intensity’ civil war is now an undeniable fact in Iraq and 
political analysts discuss the probabilities of its transformation into a ‘high 
intensity’ civil war. The outcome of such a full fledged civil war will be the 
disintegration of Iraq into three regions, namely a northern Kurdish region, a Shiite 
southern part, and probably a middle region with Sunnite dominance. An unstable 
destructive mode of coordination is presently dominant in Iraq, and may turn into 
complete chaos. The situation in Afghanistan is quite similar to that of Iraq. 
Although, the European and American occupying military forces tried to build a 
new state through the convention of several Loya Jergas (grand assembly, or grand 
council) since December 5, 2001, this allegedly historical tool of ‘consent-building’ 
among the settled and nomadic Pashtun and other tribes did not fulfil ‘conflict 
resolution’11 that was expected from it. The Taliban militia are once again gaining 
power in different regions and even within the nascent official state (Mann, 2005, 
Chapter 5).  
 
Throughout history, colonialism has always led to the fragility of the colonial state 
due to its dependence on outside resources. The sovereignty crisis nurtures the 
                                                 
10
 For a detailed analysis of different political factions in post-revolutionary Iran, see Barzin, 1995, 
1998; Mortaji, 1999; Zarifi Nia, 1999; Shadloo, 2000; Saeidi, 2002.  
 
11
 For a very critical assessment of Loya Jerga in the past and present, see Hanifi, 2004. 
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development of local (religious or non religious) networks of resistance and 
strengthens coordination through customs and traditions. This crisis is particularly 
acute in case of military occupation and ‘empire of domination’ since it destroys the 
existing sovereignty and provokes at the same time a resistance movement. The 
dominance of a destructive mode of coordination is the normal outcome. 
 
The coexistence of state and religious authority with regard to physical coercion, 
the mafia type of association, the borderline situations, factional politics, military 
occupation and colonialism are different situations in which a specific type of 
contradictory orders pervades and leads to destructive coordination. The list is not 
exhaustive and other sources of destructive coordination may be identified. 
However, a general characteristic of destructive coordination is that it is based on 
parallel institutions that require the use of extra legal, non-institutional coercion to 
regulate their relationships. The other characteristics of this type of coordination 
will be studied in the following section. 
 
2. Main characteristics of destructive coordination 
 
Each mode of coordination is backed up by an institutional arrangement that is 
related to a particular form of power. In the previous section, we argued that 
destructive coordination is supported by parallel institutions and it can be defined as 
a social organization through the direct use of non-institutional coercive means. 
 
Social organization embraces allocation of scarce resources and direction of human 
activities. The allocation mechanism includes real and monetary transactions. The 
role of monetarized transactions in coordination should also be studied. The 
decision structure or the particular domination relationship, the information flow 
between different levels of decision making, and the motivation structure of agents 
determine the direction of human activities. Hence, a systematic analysis of 
destructive coordination requires investigating the specific characteristics of its: 1) 
Allocation mechanism; 2) Monetary and non monetary transactions; 3) Decision 
structure; 4) Information flow; 5) Motivation structure. 
 
2.1 Appropriative allocation of resources 
 
In the neo-classical economics, the closest expression to the ‘mode of coordination’ 
is the ‘allocation mechanism’ that captures the allocation of scarce resources. The 
concept is devoid of any institutional connotation, and ignores non economic 
factors altogether especially the sovereignty question. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy 
that Pareto acknowledges at least two different ‘allocation mechanisms’, namely the 
productive and the appropriative ones: “The efforts of men are utilized in two 
different ways: they are directed to the production or transformation of economic 
goods, or else to the appropriation of goods produced by others” (Pareto, [1927] 
1971, p. 341). However, since the appropriative activity does not come within the 
scope of free choice, it cannot under the neoclassical view concern the economist. 
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Hence, throughout history the ‘allocation mechanism’ for scarce resources has been 
limited to the the market allocation12. 
 
Borrowing Pareto’s distinction between ‘productive’ and ‘appropriative’ human 
efforts, the allocation mechanism in a destructive coordination should be 
characterized as ‘appropriative’. Social organization through the direct use of non-
institutional coercive means assumes a situation where the protection of one’s life 
and property is yet the primordial concern of everybody. The allocation of resources 
to protect one’s life and property, to be part of power circles or to be protected from 
the state’s abuses leaves less resources to be devoted to productive activities. 
Instead it enhances investing in protective and appropriative means. Adam Smith’s 
[1776]1961 contention that security is more important than opulence is particularly 
relevant in destructive coordination. Property rights depend on sovereignty. Once 
sovereignty relies more on direct use of physical coercion than legal rights and 
sanctions, then one’s property may be confiscated arbitrarily by those who control 
coercive means. The entitlements and obligations then become conditional on one’s 
relationship with power circles. In other words, destructive rather than economic 
power plays a primary role in the resource allocation.  
 
Private as well as state ownership assumes that property rights are institutionalized 
and are well defined so that the ultimate boundary of ownership, namely the right to 
destroy (abusus) is also legally clarified and enforced. But the primary role of 
destructive power in resource allocation implies extra legal, ambiguous, undefined, 
or non-institutionalized (or insufficiently institutionalized) property rights. Booties 
in warfare and looting, or confiscated properties in a revolution are what I call 
‘indeterminate’ properties. Although they can be transformed into ‘public’, 
‘personal’, ‘private’, ‘combinatorial’, or other types of property ownership, their 
initial status remains indeterminate. In ‘indeterminate’ properties, entitlements to 
property rights depend on the discretionary power of the coercive authority. 
Appropriative allocation leads to indeterminate property. One salient illustration of 
indeterminate property is the Bonyads (Foundations) in post-revolutionary Iran. 
 
Bonyads are regarded as ‘para-governmental’ (Saeidi, 2004), or ‘parastatal 
foundations’ (Maloney, 2000). There exist a great variety of Bonyads among which 
Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazan (BMJ, Foundation of the Oppressed and Self-
Sacrificers) and Bonyad-e Shahid (Martyrs’ Foundation)13 are the most prominent 
                                                 
12
 Frank Knight (1947) contends that other forms of allocation existed during the primitive stages of 
human history through ‘custom’ and ‘authority’ that stand for instinctive and half conscious 
behaviors of human beings. Market allocation based on free enterprise is the only form related to 
deliberate consensus and conscious activities of human beings. 
13
 This Foundation was established a month after the 1979 revolution to support the surviving 
relatives of the martyrs and the disabled veterans of the revolution and later the families of the 
martyrs of the eight year war with Iraq. For a more detailed report, see Encyclopedia Iranica, 1987, 
pp. 360-61; Maloney, 2000, pp. 151-2; Saeidi, 2004, pp. 488-490. For some recent data regarding its 
activities as well as a similar Bonyad, namely Imam Khomeyni Relief Aid Committee, see Sazman 
Modiryaat va Barnameh Rizi Keshvar Salnameh Amari Keshvar 1383 (The annual statistics of the 
country) 2004, pp. 551-2, 565-571.    
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ones.  The BMJ was set up after the confiscation of the assets of the late Shah and 
53 industrialists in exile in the aftermath of revolution in conformity with 
Khomeyni’s injunction that called these assets ‘spoils’ and added that ‘they must be 
kept and controlled separately from state properties’ (Saeidi, 2004, p. 484). The size 
and scope of the BMJ is like a government (the New York Times, Jan 8, 1995). With 
holdings worth 12 billion US dollar, the BMJ constitutes the largest non-state sector 
in the economy, second only to the National Iranian Oil Company in size14 (Smith, 
1997; Maloney, 2000). Although, because of total opacity, there is no accurate 
information about Bonyad’s activities, the recent Economic report of the French 
Embassy estimates that its different branches contribute to 7-10 per cent of GDP 
(Ambassade de France, Mission Economique, 20 juin 2006). The BMJ operates like 
a holding with many enterprises extending almost in all sectors of the economy 
such as mining, housing, manufacturing, trade, shipping, transportation, airline, 
tourism, agriculture, food industry and soft beverages, etc. Recently, it has been 
strengthening its position in the energetic (including hydrocarbon) and 
communication (second Iranian mobile operator, etc.) sectors. However, this giant 
holding has an ‘ostrich position’ with regard to its institutional status. It can change 
its spots at will, acting as a private economy when buying privatized firms15, but 
going ‘public’ to control such ‘strategic’ businesses as the national shipping line, 
enshrined in the Iranian constitution as a publicly owned agency. This ostrich 
position is due to its indeterminate property structure. It is neither private nor state-
owned. The legal status of the foundations has been described as public, non-
governmental organizations, a somewhat paradoxical classification, but faithful in 
reflecting their ‘indeterminate’ nature. With no governmental discretion over their 
expenses, no shareholders, no public accounts, and no well defined legal status, 
they have been operating autonomously from the government. However, as 
professedly ‘charitable’ organizations, they have been benefiting from tax 
exemptions (IMF Staff Country Report, 1998, p. 26), preferential bank credits, 
subsidies and special ‘quasi-budgetary redistribution’ (Coville, 2002).   
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 Saeidi (2004, p. 493) notes that the total budget of the foundations was estimated at nearly half of 
the government’s national budget, 6000 billion rials, at the end of the 1980s. 
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 Regarding the ‘privatisation’ policy advocated in the first and second quadrennial programmes 
known as  the ‘Adjustment Programme’ and the ‘Stabilisation Programme’ during two periods of 
presidency of Rafsanjani (1989-1997), it is noteworthy that  the fourth Majlis (1992-1996) passed a 
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prisoners of war, and the relatives and members of those who were killed in the war have the priority 
to own the privatised enterprises. In this way, the ‘privatisation’ trend consists in transferring state 
enterprises to the Foundations or to the parastatal sector (Adeli, 2004, pp. 474-75). In the same vein, 
the recent intervention of the Supreme Leader, Khamenei, in favour of privatisation in July 2006 has 
been preceded by the conclusion of two important contracts with Bonyads and Sepah for the 
construction of Line 6 and 7 of Tehran’s subway reaching to a total amount of two and a half billion 
dollars. Finally, Tehran Stock Exchange TSE is principally a market for the parastatal sector. As 
Jbili, Kramarenko, and Bailen (2004, p. 44) note: “Most listed companies [in TSE] are parastatal 
enterprises with a varying degree of direct and indirect government ownership.” (The phrase in the 
bracket is added). 
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Despite the historical defense of the vaqf16 (Islamic religious endowment) by the 
ulama, the foundations, as ‘charitable’ organizations, are not attached to any 
religious institution. Of course, they are absolutely loyal to the supreme leader and 
to local religious leaders who act as their representatives.  But they are unconnected 
to the clerical Shiite hierarchy and the traditional religious networks: “the Bonyad-e 
Mostazafan operates, for all intents and purposes, outside the scope of both the 
traditional religious power structure and the government.” (Maloney, 2000, p. 157). 
Religious endowments (Vaqf) continue to command vast amounts of resources in 
the Islamic Republic; and the Bonyad-e Astan-e Qods, which manages the 
endowments related to the shrine of Imam Reza at Mashhad, owns property all over 
the country17. Contrary to the Shah’s regime, the Islamic Republic has guaranteed 
the independence of Vaqf from the government; but the Foundations maintain their 
autonomy from both the government and the traditional religious hierarchy. 
 
What then are these Foundations, and to whom do they belong? They own 
‘confiscated’ properties (‘spoils’ in Khomeyni’s terminology) that could have been 
transformed into private or state properties, but were not. Contrary to the dominant 
view, the state sector in the post-revolutionary Iran does not resemble the 
omnipresent state of the USSR. The analogy to post-Soviet Russia, where the 
dismantling of an entrenched system of power and the concomitant rise of new 
political and financial magnates (powerful transitory ‘financial-industrial groups’18) 
has empowered an array of puissant clientelist networks, is more appealing. But 
unlike their Russian counterparts, they have not transformed into private 
monopolies either. Their permanent position as an ‘indeterminate’ form of property 
is due to the extension of parallel institutions even into the Iranian economy under 
the Islamic Republic. “These organizations represent the dual power structure in 
Iran which reinforces the financial authority of religious leaders without 
accountability” (Saeidi, 2004, p. 479). They constitute the authoritative resources of 
theocrat leaders: they favor and empower the parallel military and paramilitary 
groups belonging to theocrats, and enrich their traditional allies, namely the 
bazaaris, and thence reproduce the authority of the Supreme Leader and theocrats. 
They enjoy an almost unconstrained capacity of intervention in the Iranian economy 
and in political competition between different factions, and may be depicted as ‘a 
state within a state.’ (Scheuer, 1994). 
 
The close relationships of the BMJ with the Bazaaris, and the Iranian security 
apparatus and its institutional authority were confirmed by the appointment of one 
of the main trusted figures of the Bazarris, Mohsen Khamooshi, as the first manager 
of the establishment, and then by the nomination of Mohsen Refiqdust, the former 
commander of the Revolutionary Guard (Sepah) to lead the foundation in 1989. 
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 For an analysis of Vaqf as a credible commitment device to give property owners economic 
security in return for social services, see Kuran, 2001. 
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 For a historical account of Astan-e Qods-e Razawi, see Mawlawi, Mostafawi, and Sakuurzada, 
1987, pp. 826-837. 
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2001. 
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Due to unaccountability and total opacity of its activities, widespread corruption in 
the BMJ and its diverse branches involving Refiqdust’s brothers and many other 
directors (see The Economist, Sep 25, 1993; The New York Times, Jan 8, 1995; 
Financial Times, Jul 17, 1997; Saeidi, 2004, pp. 495-98) led to the replacement of 
Refiqdust by the former Defense Minister Mohammad Foruzandeh in July 199919. 
During Refiqdust’s direction, the organizational connections between the 
Revolutionary Guard and the BMJ developed substantial involvement in weapons 
procurement and production. For example, “the Bonyad’s heavy presence in 
legitimate mining and chemicals production allegedly camouflage IRGC [the 
Revolutionary Guard] chemical weaponry plants. In addition, German intelligence 
sources contend that the MJF [Bonyad] has utilized a network of sham enterprises 
to acquire inputs for the Revolutionary Guard’s defense industry, including its 
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons as well as its missile development. In 
addition, the foundation apparently undertakes international endeavors that 
transgress the traditional definition of trade - the MJF is commonly cited as a 
generous supporter and active political patron of the Lebanese terrorist 
organization, Hezbollah…In addition, state control over the industrial sector meant 
that ‘the commercial bourgeoisie became the most active faction of the ruling 
class.’ This, of course, represents another potent link between the bazaar and the 
bonyads: they are ‘the only winners’ in the Islamic Republic’s lackluster economic 
history.” (Maloney, 2000, pp. 159-160). 
 
A close examination of the Foundations in Iran shows that they promote 
‘destructive creation’ which is the exact opposite of Schumpeter’s ‘creative 
destruction’. Schumpeter (1951, chapter VII) referred to the process of capitalist 
development as ‘creative destruction’, namely the destruction of old products, past 
processes of manufacturing and archaic forms of organization through the 
introduction of new products, ways of producing and organizational methods. In 
destructive coordination, we have the opposite process of ‘destructive creation’ 
implying the production of destructive means and the necessary infrastructure and 
skills related to such means so that the authoritative resources and relationships 
could be reproduced. The dynamic of appropriative coordination can be defined as 
destructive creation20. Does this mean that this type of coordination is by definition 
a hindrance to the economic growth? 
 
Historical investigation shows that ‘destructive creation’ has not always been an 
impediment to productive activities. In fact, the military revolution and the 
development of the ‘industry of destruction’ in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries (Roberts, 1956; Parker, 1988) prepared the industrial revolution in the 
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eighteenth century. In some countries like England and France, destructive 
coordination during the ‘primitive accumulation of capital’ provided the necessary 
prerequisites of industrialization and economic growth. All this depends on the way 
destructive coordination articulates with market, bureaucratic, and ethical 
coordination and whether it plays a dominant role. For instance, in post-
revolutionary Iran, it has occupied a predominant place and directly favored 
traditional social groups such as theocrats and their coercive military and 
paramilitary apparatus, as well as traditional merchants (Baazaris). This social 
alliance between the theocrats, new coercive apparatus, and bazaaris has hindered 
the development of modern sectors especially in industry and service. Nonetheless, 
even under these circumstances, ‘destructive creation’ contributed to the 
development of infrastructures necessary for military purposes as well as the 
armament industry with some positive spillovers for civil industries such as car 
manufacturing during the war with Iraq (see Mohammadi, 2006). Unquestionably, 
the overall impact of such coordination in terms of provoking critical situations 
through which the theocrats could reproduce their authoritative resources had been 
an eminent catastrophe for Iranian economy21. One would have a better appraisal of 
the extent of the catastrophic economic and social consequences of destructive 
coordination, when one notice that despite tripled revenues from petrol, the capital 
flight from Iran has reached to its highest point since the presidency of 
Ahmadinejad.  
 
Since Pahlavi’s dynasty, Iran’s economy has been characterized by the dominance 
of a rentier state dependent on petrol revenue (Katouzian, 1981). The 
underdeveloped character of the industrial sector has accordingly been related to 
‘the Dutch Disease’. But the post-revolutionary Iran has been witnessing the 
dominance of destructive coordination that can be called ‘the Iranian Disease’, a 
pandemic more dangerous than ‘the Dutch Disease’ for economic growth and 
development in Iran as well as in the whole Middle East. 
 
2.2 Inflationary economics 
 
The market mode of coordination is the only form of coordination which is 
necessarily monetarized. Transactions in an ethical coordination (reciprocity) are, as 
a rule, not monetarized, though exceptions may exist where gifts are given in a 
monetary form. In the bureaucratic mode of coordination, the transactions are not 
necessarily monetarized, but if they are, the subordinates are financially dependent 
on the superiors. In bureaucratic coordination, the money is semi passive and the 
syndrome of the ‘soft budget constraint’ (Kornai, 1980) is usually prevalent. In 
destructive coordination, due to appropriative, predatory, or grabbing allocation of 
resources, money’s role is superseded by the violence. In fact, as Clower and Due 
(1972, p. 320) have already averred, ‘theft and philanthropy’ are not subject to the 
                                                 
21
 Detailed studies of military industrialization in Third World countries that emerged as arms 
producers in the 1970s and 1980s such as Brazil, India, and South Korea aver that “Third World 
military industries face enduring and formidable obstacles to sustained expansion” (Conca, 1997, p. 
255).  
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budget constraint postulate. Although, the army has been the cradle of wage 
relationship (McNeil, 1982), and the war spoils have been the source of market 
extension (Vahabi, 2004, pp. 208-215), the war economy as well as revolution 
escapes from the cost-benefit analysis. In destructive coordination, transactions may 
be either monetarized or not, but unlike market coordination, the money does not 
play the central role in coordinating activities. 
 
In recent periods, destructive coordination is marked by a chronic inflationary 
tendency. Several institutional factors underline this tendency. The first one is the 
primary role of authority relationship over property ownership that gives a priority 
to strategic non economic (political or ideological) considerations over the 
economic considerations. Keynes (1940) was also emphasizing that the warfare is 
not subject to the cost-benefit analysis, and military expenditures lead to 
inflationary pressures. The political instability provides a second reason for the 
chronic inflationary tendency. In fact, destructive coordination is usually related to 
a sovereignty crisis that undermines a credible commitment by the state to monetary 
stabilization. The state can never respect the independence of central bank and 
easily violates it even if it is legally proclaimed, since the discretionary authority of 
coercive bodies and the predatory activities of all the shadow institutions override 
the monetary considerations. The parallel institutions and their intense rivalry22 to 
‘grab’ resources increase highly the amount of resources allocated to ‘protective’ 
expenditures. An expansionary budgetary policy ensues that breeds in its turn more 
rivalry in grabbing resources. This ‘intensified’ rivalry provokes a cumulative 
process that inflates more and more the current expenditures of different official 
and non official organizations detrimental to productive activity stricto sensu. Last 
but not least, the opacity and non accountability23 of strategic parallel organizations 
may lead not only to excessive ‘corruption’, but also to an ever increasing 
allocation of resources to grabbing the ‘state’ resources by the state officials or 
other unofficial authorities. The extra budgetary expenditures underpin the 
expansionary budgetary policy, and given the same level of supply, it leads to 
inflation.  
 
In short, in a monetary economy, destructive coordination may be characterized by 
a chronic inflationary tendency in which quasi-budgetary and redistributive policies 
supersede the monetary policy.  
    
2.3 Dual decision structure  
 
Parallel institutions shape a dual decision structure, formal and informal. Formally, 
decision structure in destructive coordination resembles bureaucratic coordination, 
in the sense that it is also hierarchical and marked by vertical linkages between 
superiors and subordinates. The superior is not elected by the subordinates, but 
appointed by another superior at a higher level of hierarchy. The relationship 
between different levels of hierarchy is thus asymmetrical and based on domination 
                                                 
22
 I will further refer to this ‘rivalry’ as ‘negative competition’ (see next section 2.3). 
23
 Regarding the opacity and non accountability problems, see section 2.3. 
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and authority. Although the higher level depends to some extent on the lower level, 
the subordinates are more dependent on the superiors. This unified and centralized 
decision structure at a formal level, does not exclude an informal non-identified 
hierarchy that undermines and even violates totally the formal decisions of the 
superiors and changes radically the orientation of activities prescribed officially.  
 
The legal or formal laws can be contradicted, discredited, or simply ignored by 
other informal institutions. Thus, the formal unified centralized structure coexists 
with an informal decentralized one. The decentralized character of parallel 
institutions seems to be less ‘authoritarian’ or hierarchical and closer to the market 
coordination with different autonomous units, and marked by horizontal linkages 
between decentralized units. However, there exists a sharp difference between the 
two types of coordination. In destructive coordination, the relationships between 
different autonomous centers are based on negative competition, implying that each 
center tries to influence the decision making process by its threat power to 
jeopardize the decisions taken by others. The participation in decision making is not 
related to what you can positively contribute to the results (for instance, your ability 
to reduce the costs or improve the quality) as in the case of ‘positive competition’ 
within the market coordination24, but rather to the extent you can destroy, obstruct, 
harm or provoke annoyances for others. I have previously called it individual or 
collective ‘threat power’ (Vahabi, 2004). Threat power covers a wide range of 
menaces or nuisances, mild as well as harsh, such as disseminating rumors to stain 
one’s reputation, falsification, exclusion, lynching, etc. When ‘negative 
competition’ is in order, you may decide to associate someone with your project not 
because s/he is qualified or can add to the project but rather to protect yourself 
against any harm s/he can cause. Furthermore, in this particular case, negative 
competition refers to competition within the realm of public goods, or public service 
among different ‘public’ or ‘parastatal servants’ and bodies. They are ‘rivals’ for 
‘non rival’ and ‘non excludable’ goods and services. Thus, parallel institutions in 
providing ‘public services’ are particularly prone to negative competition.    
 
One of the major characteristics of this dual decision structure is that the decision 
centre cannot be identified or at least easily known. Faceless deciders or eminence 
grise are more powerful than known officeholders. Moreover, it is never clear at 
what level the decisions are made, who is responsible and with whom should the 
negotiations be engaged. For instance, not only the decisions of the President of the 
Republic, but even the verdicts of the Supreme Leader in Iran whose authority is 
generally uncontested, may be overruled by some concerted acts of unofficial 
parallel groups. Although decisions are made by faceless people, the decision 
making is extremely imbedded in local and personal networks far from any type of 
                                                 
24
 Market competition can also be negative. Chamberlin  (1953) imagines this type of competition 
regarding monopolistic competition: each producer tries to minimise costs by altering the product ( 
and selling the product at a less expensive price than his competitors) leading to the general 
deterioration of the quality of the products as described in Gresham’s law: the bad products drive out 
the good ones from the market. 
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‘impersonal’ processes of market decision making. Negative competition makes 
trust a highly valuable asset, since one can only rely on the circle of trust. The 
members of the circle, of course, can change from time to time, but the fundamental 
ties and bonds should be rooted in customary and traditional relationships such as 
marriage, family, clan, caste, etc. so that they cannot be easily broken. Hence, 
destructive coordination shares a common point with ethical coordination regarding 
the reciprocity relationship and internal enforcement. But it is in sharp contrast with 
ethical coordination with regard to its dependence on hierarchical relationship as 
well as to the use of direct coercive means in settling the unsettled disputes among 
parallel institutions.       
 
2.4 Secrecy, indoctrination, and scream 
 
In destructive coordination, the flow of information is formally vertical or through 
commands coming from the superiors to the subordinates. In this respect, it 
resembles bureaucratic coordination. However, given the dual decision structure, 
commanding is not the only type of information flow. The informal ‘commands’ 
coming from ‘nowhere’ are more important than commands given by official 
superiors. Bypassing official orders through coup-type activity and populist 
mobilization is a common method. Moreover, to keep the identity of the eminence 
grise secret requires control over the means of communication through systematic 
censorship. The informal decision structure requires total opacity and non 
accountability of the parallel economic and non-economic organizations to the 
public. However, censorship is not sufficient to guarantee the bypassing, since 
compliance to informal orders rather than legal orders should be justified. The 
justification of authority needs indoctrination. Hence, in addition to secrecy, like 
‘ethical’ or ‘preceptoral coordination’, persuasion is usually employed in 
destructive coordination to legitimate the compliance to informal orders. 
 
Despite secrecy and indoctrination, negative competition among parallel institutions 
leads to sporadic ‘public’ revelation of information through fracas. Borrowing 
Hirschman’s distinctions between ‘exit’, ‘loyalty’ and ‘voice’ as different feedbacks 
or information mechanisms (Hirschman, 1970), market, ethical, and bureaucratic 
coordination may be classified according to their reliance on these mechanisms. 
Market coordination uses ‘exit’, whereas bureaucratic coordination is associated 
with ‘voice’25. Ethical or preceptoral coordination takes ‘loyalty’ as a background. 
In destructive coordination, however, secrecy and loyalty, is completed by what I 
have elsewhere called ‘scream’ (Vahabi, 2004, pp. 88-96). What is ‘screaming’ and 
how can it fit into the above classification? ‘Scream’ may be defined as a form of 
‘voice’ if Hirschman’s ambiguous concept of ‘voice’ is clarified. 
 
Hirschman fails to distinguish two different types of ‘voice’: voice within the 
existing rules, and voice against the existing rules. While voice within the existing 
rules can be opposed to exit as abandoning the existing rules or organization, voice 
                                                 
25
 Hirschman himself argues for such a relationship between private versus public sectors. While in 
the former, ‘exit’ dominates, in the latter ‘voice’ pervades (Hirschman, 1970, 1981, 1982).  
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against the existing rules cannot clearly be opposed to exit, since in this case the 
frontiers between voice and exit become blurred. In other words, voice within the 
existing rules comes within the scope of Hirschman’s dichotomy of voice versus 
exit, whereas voice against the existing rules escapes this dichotomy and cannot be 
opposed to exit. To voice against the existing rules, one should also do a particular 
kind of exit, for example not to be among “loyalists” and join “others” or 
opponents.  
 
I define ‘scream’ as voice against the existing rules. With parallel institutions at 
work, the negative competition of one faction against the others overrules the 
formal legal rules. Ruling factions then behave as if they are both formal supporters 
and informal adversaries of the existing order at the same time. They occasionally 
jeopardise or even torpedo each others’ projects by revealing information through 
scandals or fracas; in brief, through ‘scream’. Iran Gate is a taste of what is to come 
in such circumstances. The flow of information in destructive coordination consists 
of secrecy, indoctrination, and scream. 
 
2. 5 Negative incentives and being in the serail 
 
In market coordination, exchange is preferable to autarky, since one may augment 
one’s utility without decreasing that of others. Positive incentives, or the exchange 
of ‘benefits’, constitute the fundamental motivational structure of the market 
exchange. But the situation is completely different in destructive coordination.  
 
In destructive coordination, an agent (A) can offer another agent (B) the benefit of 
not injuring him as long as (B) acts according to (A)’s wishes. But is that a benefit 
to (B)? It is not a benefit to (B), if measured against his welfare, if (A) and (B) did 
not have any relationship in the past. In the presence of threat, one prefers autarky 
to exchange. Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure provides a nice example. Angelo, 
acting in place of the Duke, decides to execute one of his prisoners. Before 
execution, he could torture him, but he has no motivation to do that. The victim has 
a sister, who comes to Angelo to plead for her brother’s life. Angelo, finding the 
sister pretty, changes his mind and announces that he will torture the victim to death 
if the sister does not sleep with him. But if the sister accepts the dishonourable deal, 
he will only execute the brother. The sister submits. Angelo’s only interest in 
torturing the brother is in what he may gain by making this threat; once there is 
somebody available to whom the threat can profitably be communicated, the 
possibility of torture has value for Angelo - not the torture itself, but the threatening 
of it. The sister has obtained negative value out of her trip. Having identified her 
interest and made herself available to receive the threatening message, she has been 
forced to suffer what she would not have had to suffer if she had never made her 
identity known or if she could have disappeared into the crowd before the threat 
was made. In this case, avoiding the worst or negative incentives shape the 
behaviour of agents.  
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Like market coordination, profit-seeking is an important motivation in destructive 
coordination based on appropriative allocation of resources. However, where 
appropriative or predatory activities occupy pride of place, property rights may 
easily be endangered. That also explains why the resources are principally directed 
towards protective activities, and even property is regarded as an authoritative 
resource. It may be then assumed that like bureaucratic coordination, in destructive 
coordination status is the most important motivation. But status does not provide the 
best guarantee. You can be the President of a Republic today and a political refugee 
the next day as it happened to Bani Sadr, the first President of the Islamic Republic. 
The most important motivation in destructive coordination is to become a ‘member 
of the serail’ or part of the ‘circle of trust’. In that case, you will have access to all 
authoritative resources including property and status, though being perspicuously 
rich and puissant provokes negative competition of rival factions. Agents are thus 
motivated to stay in the shadow and within the serail.  
 
Conclusion 
 
We demonstrated clearly that besides market, bureaucratic and ethical coordination, 
there existed another type of coordination that we coined as destructive 
coordination. Destructive coordination as social organisation through the use of 
coercive means has existed throughout history, but in recent times its emergence is 
related to a particular type of contradictory orders and parallel institutions. This 
form of coordination must not be confused with chaos and anarchy, and may not 
necessarily be transitory. Although located on the borderline of social order and 
disorder, it may be more or less stable and owns its particular characteristics with 
regard to allocation mechanism, monetary and non monetary transactions, decision 
structure, information flow, and motivation structure.  
 
It is an appropriative allocation with a dual decision structure and negative 
competition in which information flow is marked by opacity, non accountability, 
indoctrination, and scream. Transactions may be monetarized but not necessarily so. 
In a monetary economy, destructive coordination breeds a chronic inflationary 
tendency. Finally, its motivation structure embraces a mixture of profit-seeking, 
status, negative incentives and being a member of the serail. The last two 
motivations are dominant. 
 
There are still several issues that require further investigation. For instance, 1) if a 
social system is a constellation of different modes of coordination, then how does 
destructive coordination interact with the other ones? 2) Can destructive 
coordination be transformed into other types of coordination? If so, to what other 
types of coordination? Hence, the interaction of destructive coordination with other 
modes of coordination and its transformation should be the subject of future 
research. 
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